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Legisprudential Considerations in Unraveling the
Safety Net: Food Stamps, Foster Care, and the
Indian Child Welfare Act
James T. Hamilton*
Introduction
In 1982, the U.S. Agriculture Department, under the direc-
tion of Secretary John Block,' amended the USDA Food Stamp
Regulations to include foster care maintenance payments (FCMP)2
as unearned income in estimating food stamp eligibility levels.3 A
class action civil rights complaint has since been filed in United
States District Court 4 on behalf of "all persons in Minnesota
whose Food Stamp benefits have been in the last twelve months or
will in the future be reduced, terminated or denied as a result of
their receipt of foster care maintenance payments."5
The plaintiffs advance several arguments in their suit against
the Secretary. They allege first that the Secretary, in administer-
ing the Food Stamp Program, has deprived plaintiffs of their rights
to due process and equal protection of the laws afforded them
under the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also contend
that the Secretary wrongfully classified foster children as mem-
bers of the foster care household. Further, the suit alleges that the
* James Hamilton will receive his J.D. from the University of Minnesota in
1987.
1. Secretary Block resigned his cabinet post in mid-February of 1986. On Jan-
uary 29, 1986, President Reagan appointed Richard Lyng to replace him. Secretary
Lyng describes himself as an "ideological twin" of Secretary Block. The new secre-
tary was a California seed company executive prior to his recent appointment to
the Agriculture Department. His history with the President dates back to his ser-
vice as the head of Governor Reagan's Agriculture Commission in California.
David Rapp, Quick Confirmation Expected: Reagan Names Richard Lyng as New
Agriculture Secretary, 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 199 (1986).
2. For a discussion of foster care maintenance payments, see infra notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
3. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(ii) (1982).
4. Murray v. Block, No. 4-85-611 (D. Minn. Plaintiff's and Defendant's Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment argued, submitted, and taken under advisement Octo-
ber 10, 1986).
5. Complaint at 3, Murray (No. 4-85-611).
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economies of scale 6 which the Secretary claims as justification for
the ruling do not exist. Finally, plaintiffs argue that judicial review
of the Secretary's decision is proper under these circumstances. 7
Although I support the plaintiff's arguments, I propose that
the Secretary's action would best be defeated on an alternate
ground. This article's perspective is that the Food Stamp Act and
regulations are an integral part of the social welfare "safety net"8
for disadvantaged children. From this perspective the Secretary's
actions are shortsighted and over-reaching in his fervor to cut ex-
penses in this program. In drafting the food stamp regulations he
did not adequately take into account the broad statutory intent in
the Food Stamp Act of 1977.9 Nor did he consider the adverse ef-
fect these rules would have upon the proper functioning of other
social welfare programs.10 An examination of the Adoption Assist-
ance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,11 and the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act,12 with a special focus on their relationship to the Food
Stamp Act, illustrates this inconsistency.
6. For a discussion of the nature of food stamp computation formulas and
economies of scale arguments, see infra note 29.
7. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Block's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss at 18-23, Murray (No. 4-85-611) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Memorandum].
8. The term "safety net" generally refers to the interlocking system of federal
aid programs designed to assist those citizens unable to provide for themselves for
reasons of physical or mental disability, economic dislocation, or other forces be-
yond their control. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
9. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982) (congressional declaration of policy behind enacting
food stamp program).
10. A special effort is made here to place the recent food stamp regulatory ac-
tion in the context of the intent of the entire Food Stamp Act of 1977, not merely
the authorizing language. The Secretary's regulations are likewise examined in the
context of other integrally related social welfare acts. My intention is to look be-
yond narrow legal issues and deal with the real life impact of the amended regula-
tions on inequality in society.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603 note, 608, 612, 620-625, 627-628, 652, 655 note, 658, 670-
672, 672 note, 673-676, 1305 note, 1308, 1318, 1320b-2-1320b-3, 1382d, 1395y, 1395cc,
1396a, 1397-1397d, 1397e-1 note (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). An argument against the Secretary's
rulemaking based on its inconsistency with the intent of the Indian Child Welfare
Act was made in a memorandum of the Amicus Curiae filed September 5, 1985 in
support of plaintiffs in Murray. See Memorandum of the Amicus Curiae, Murray
(No. 4-85-611) [hereinafter Amicus]. Predictably, the United States Attorney re-
sponded that because the federal action regarding foster care maintenance pay-
ments is not in direct contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Secretary
was under no duty to consider the effects of his actions on this Act. The United
States Attorney stated that "[t]he ICWA simply is not addressed to the operation of
the food stamp program." See Federal Defendant's Response to the Memorandum
of the Amicus Curiae at 3, Murray (No. 4-85-611) [hereinafter Defendant's Re-
sponse]. Such a narrow view of a secretary's responsibilities to the effective func-
tioning of government obscures the notion of program networking. See infra notes
41-58 and accompanying text.
UNRAVELING THE SAFETY NET
I. The History of the Food Stamp Act
In 1939, the United States still suffered from the effects of
the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing depression. Farmers
were unable to sell their products in the marketplace while
thousands of families were unable to adequately feed themselves.
Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration and the New Deal Con-
gress took an unprecedented and innovative step in the attempt to
alleviate the problem. Under the authority of the Agricultural
Adjustment Assistance Act of 1933,13 the Secretary of Agriculture
promulgated regulations for the first food stamp program.14
The program's scope was limited15 but proved to be tremen-
dously popular. Due to the exigencies of the war and a falling un-
employment rate, the program was discontinued in 1943.
Legislation to reinstate a food stamp program was introduced in
each session of Congress from 1943 until 1964, when the current
Act was passed.16 Congressional approval of a food stamp act had,
however, occurred earlier than 1964. In 1959, Congress authorized
a program to distribute surplus commodities. 17 The basic thrust of
the surplus distribution program was aimed at stimulating the
farm economy rather than at alleviating hunger. Neither goal,
however, was ever achieved under this limited program. The Ei-
senhower administration failed to follow through on the program
and it died an ignominious death.' 8
The Kennedy administration swiftly focused the nation's at-
tention on feeding the poor and stimulating the agricultural econ-
omy. Early in his term, President Kennedy issued an executive
order providing for an expanded food distribution program. 19
Later, in his February, 1961 message to Congress, Kennedy stated
his intent to establish a pilot program aimed at providing addi-
13. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, amended by Act of Aug. 24, 1935, ch.
641, § 32, 49 Stat. 774-75.
14. 7 C.F.R. § 1101.001 (Supp. 1939). This program provided public assistance to
eligible families with two series of stamps. The orange series were used to
purchase food at retail stores; the purple series, distributed at a ratio of one for
every two orange series, were redeemable for surplus food procured and distributed
by the government.
15. Only 48 cities and 136 counties were participating in the program when it
was discontinued in 1943.
16. See generally S. Rep. No. 1124, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1964
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3275, 3276-77 (legislative commentary on early
food stamp programs); Martin Frey, The Spiraling Food Stamp Program, 3 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 285 (1972) (discussion of early food stamp program).
17. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 86-341, 73
Stat. 606, 607 (1959).
18. See Frey, supra note 16, at 287.
19. Exec. Order No. 10,914, 3 C.F.R. 443-44 (1959-1963) (temporary order).
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tional nutrition to those in need, and urged substantial improve-
ment in a food distribution system for the poor.20
Congress acted within the year to establish a pilot program in
eight jurisdictions, including cities and rural counties.21 The pilot
program rapidly expanded to include forty counties and three ma-
jor cities in twenty-two states, availing benefits to 392,000 people. 22
The programs proved highly successful in achieving both the agri-
cultural stimulation and public welfare goals envisioned by
supporters. 23
Shortly after establishing the pilot programs, the eighty-
eighth Congress overwhelmingly approved a national policy to
feed the poor. The Food Stamp Act of 196424 was signed by Presi-
dent Johnson on August 31, 1964. On December 3, 1964, Secretary
of Agriculture Orville Freeman authorized regulations for the op-
eration of the program, marking the beginning of the most prolific
and ambitious nutrition program in United States history.
25
The food stamp program's growth was unprecedented both in
dollars spent and in numbers of people served. The program be-
gan with a $75 million budget in 1964. By 1975 the food stamp pro-
gram was spending $100 million per month.26 From 1964 to 1970,
the number of people served by the food stamp program escalated
from roughly 4,000,000 to 10,000,000.27
As the program grew, its emphasis shifted. It became clear
that Congress intended the food stamp program to supply the nu-
tritional needs of the poor,28 and in so doing, to eradicate nutri-
20. President's Message to Congress Discussing Economic Recovery and
Growth, 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1028, 1033.
21. The administration acted with notable speed in establishing a pilot program.
The eight areas chosen by the Department of Agriculture for the pilot program
were announced about a month from the time the President addressed Congress.
Named as the pilot areas on March 7, 1961 were Franklin County, Kentucky, the
city of Detroit, Michigan, the Virginia-Hibbing-Nashwauk complex in northern
Minnesota, Silver Bow County, Montana, San Mijuel County, New Mexico, Fayette
County, Pennsylvania, and McDowell County, West Virginia. 26 Fed. Reg. 4137
(1961).
22. For a list of the participating jurisdictions and the relevant statistical analy-
sis, see S. Rep. No. 1124, supra note 16.
23. Id. at 3280-81.
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029 (1964).
25. 29 Fed. Reg. 16,784-88 (1964).
26. Frey, supra note 16, at 285.
27. 116 Cong. Rec. 22,412 (1970).
28. It is Professor Frey's contention that the unprecedented expansion of this
program was caused by a shift in emphasis from an agricultural to a welfare pro-
gram. As a welfare program, there were inexorable pressures on the government
to expand the program which, Professor Frey insists, led to an onerous burden on
United States society. While it is true that the program has become predominantly
a welfare program, it would be a mistake to discount the effect this program has
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tional inequality based on income.29 In 1971, to underscore its
evolving attitude toward the food stamp program, Congress passed
an amendment to the Act indicating that the program's goals were
limited to supplemental aid. The program was seen in more com-
prehensive terms: "[t]o alleviate ... hunger and malnutrition [and
to] permit low income households to purchase a nutritionally ade-
quate diet through normal channels of trade."30
Congress undertook a thorough revision of the Act in 1977.31
Most legislators conceded that more congressional control was
needed as the program grew. Congress also expanded the Act's
specificity by amendment and addition.32 This process continued
through a critical period in the nation's economy and several ad-
had on the United States farm economy. See Frey, supra note 16, at 287. Further,
Professor Frey's criticism is even less valid since several measures he suggested to
curb abuses of the program were adopted. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying
text.
29. "Participation in the food stamp program shall be limited to those house-
holds whose income and other financial resources... are determined to be a sub-
stantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more nutritious diet." 7
U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). The states are to determine eligibility guide-
lines based on 125% of the "poverty line" as determined by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (1982 & Supp. 1985). The responsible state
agency is to calculate benefits based on a sliding scale of benefits to income. The
basis for calculating the benefits in a given eligible household is a state-calculated
"Thrifty Food Plan." This is defined as the "diet required to feed a family of four
persons consisting of a man and woman twenty through fifty-four, a child six
through eight and a child nine through eleven." Id. The cost of this diet is deter-
mined by the Secretary of Agriculture and is adjusted for family size by applying
regional and household economies of scale. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(o) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
The Agriculture Department uses an economy of scale argument to justify its inclu-
sion of FCMP as unearned income. While this may be justified for the average food
stamp family, such is not the case for foster care families. First, "foster families are
not obligated to provide financial support for their foster children," and likewise,
"the foster child is not expected to financially support the host family." Plaintiffs'
Memorandum, supra note 7, at 15. Second, any adjustment in benefits to account
for economy of scale should be done at the level of AFDC assistance not in food
stamp grants. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
30. Food Stamp Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 1, 84 Stat. 2048 (cur-
rent version at 7 U.S.C. § 2011-2029 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
31. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (current version at
7 U.S.C. § 2011-2029 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
32. It is useful to gauge the scope of the 1977 changes in the Food Stamp Act by
a cursory examination of the increased length of the Act. A section of special im-
portance to this article is an example of this prolixity-the section determining in-
come guidelines for eligibility standard: 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1977). In 1964, this section
occupied 12 lines of text. See Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 5, 78 Stat. 704 (1964). In 1977,
the same section occupied nearly three full pages. See Pub. L. No. 95-113, §§ 5-6, 91
Stat. 958, 962-64 (1977). As a result of extensive amendment, the eligibility guide-
lines section became much more specific. This specificity shows an increasing de-
sire on the part of Congress to guide the food stamp program's administration. The
1964 Act merely stated a specific intention to benefit low-income families and rele-
gated to the states the onerous task of determining the appropriate level of assist-
ance. The 1977 amendments, however, meticulously defined what kind of income
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ministration changes.3 3 Significantly, throughout this period, Con-
gress never waivered from its basic intent to eradicate nutritional
inadequacy based on income inequality and to do so fairly.
34
Despite its laudable purpose and performance, the food stamp
program has come under repeated attack. Many perceive it to be
rife with recipient fraud.35 Unfortunately, there has been abuse.
Particularly relevant to this article was a loophole in the statutory
definition of "household": parents and children who live together
could qualify as separate households by claiming separate food
preparation and purchase functions.36
was included or excluded in determining "low income." As a whole, the Act grew
from its original seven pages to over 24 pages of amendments in 1977.
33. The food stamp program has been subject to major amendment by virtually
every Congress since 1979. See Pub. L. No. 96-58, 93 Stat. 389 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-
249, 94 Stat. 357 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 358 (1981); Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96
Stat. 772 (1982). The current version of the Food Stamp Act is at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2029 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
34. There was substantial pressure on the federal government from the 1980
election onward to drastically trim domestic spending. The food stamp program, as
the second largest entitlement program, came under intense scrutiny. In 1981, the
proposed food stamp budget was cut by $2.6 billion. The program's strength be-
came clear under pressure. Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, a farm state senator and
the newly elected majority leader of the Senate, flexed the program's agricultural
support muscles and forced the White House to reduce the cut to $1.8 billion.
Meanwhile over 100 groups, from unions to civil rights organizations, from
churches to grocery stores, were brought together to fight the cuts. More than 100
poor people were brought before Congress to lobby their representatives to vote
against the budget slashing. Steven V. Roberts, Debate Opens on Cuts in Food
Stamps, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1981, at B13, col. 1 [hereinafter Roberts, Debate
Opens]. For further information on the budget process in 1981 and its effect on the
food stamp program, see also Steven V. Roberts, Supporters and Critics of Food
Stamps Prepare to Battle on Scope of Program, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1981, at B9, col.
1; Steven V. Roberts, 'Antihunger' Lobbyists Start Their Rounds, N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1981, at B5, col. 3. In the face of this pressure on Congress and the White
House, the program has demonstrated a relative immunity from the budget-cutting
fever which gripped Capitol Hill after the election of President Reagan. The fol-
lowing are the food stamp allocations since 1979: Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-58, 93
Stat. 389 - $6,778,900,000; Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-243, 94 Stat. 345-
$9,191,000,000; Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-18, 95 Stat. 102-$11,480,000,000; Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat. 785-$12,874,000,000. The 1982 amendment also au-
thorized expenditures "not in excess of $13,145,000,000 for the fiscal year ending
Sept. 30, 1984; and not in excess of $13,933,000,000 for the fiscal year ending Septem-
ber 30, 1985." Id.
35. During the 1981 budget hearings, the level of insensitivity and shortsighted-
ness reached heights not seen since the 1890's. Chief among the food stamp witch-
hunters was Senate Agriculture Committee Chair Jesse Helms of North Carolina.
The Senator gave new fire to old conservative complaints. He degraded the pro-
gram as being exploited by able-bodied workers and warned that the greatest harm
of the food stamp program would befall the recipients themselves. In addition, the
Senator warned the hungry that accepting the benefits would destroy their initia-
tive. Apparently the senator forgot that malnutrition destroys more than -mere ini-
tiative. See Roberts, Debate Opens, supra note 34, at B13, col. 1.
36. Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i).
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In 1981, the newly elected United States Senate quickly rec-
ognized the loophole in the Act's definition of "household." 37 As a
response, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to treat parents
and children living in the same household as a single household re-
gardless of how food is purchased or prepared.38 The next year
Congress further amended the Act to consider siblings residing to-
gether as a single household.39
Using this congressional initiative as a justification, and under
the authority given the Secretary of Agriculture to "issue such reg-
ulations consistent with this Chapter as the Secretary deems nec-
essary or appropriate,"40 Secretary of Agriculture John Block
issued the regulations which form the focus of this article. Con-
trary to this claim of authority, however, and viewed in light of
this and other similar congressional acts, these regulations are not
consistent with congressional intent. Such regulations are neither
necessary to the proper functioning of the food stamp program,
nor appropriate in the face of the critical condition of neglected
children.
II. Gnawing at the Safety Net: Secretary Block, Reaganomics, and the
Frustration of Legislative Intent
President Reagan and his critics have consistently differed on
the nature and purpose of the so-called "safety net" of social wel-
fare programs. Even the most extreme conservatives agree that
some system of assistance for the indigent, especially for the chil-
dren of poverty, is a legitimate function of government. 41 Such a
37. S. Rep. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 442. The report noted:
Because small households are provided more food stamps per person
and because the same standard deduction is applied to income regard-
less of household size, a residential unit that splits into several smaller
households can, under present law, receive larger total benefits than
would be the case if the individuals applied as a single, larger
household.
The legislative prescription would be to "require that parents and children who are
living together would always be defined as a single household unit, regardless of
whether they purchase food and prepare meals together." Id.
38. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 101, 95 Stat.
358 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i)).
39. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, § 192, 96
Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i)). Congress rejected the Senate's
move to include all related persons living together in the same household and lim-
ited the final revision to include only siblings, thus saving the Department of Agri-
culture the task of delving into extended geneologies. S. Rep. No. 504, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 9260, 9262.
40. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982).
41. Ostensibly, even the President is committed to retaining a safety net under
the poor and disadvantaged. President Reagan has recognized the legitimate gov-
1986]
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system may require considerable reworking of the social welfare
system. In the most paranoid of moods, we are sometimes given to
think that this reworking entails a system akin to Dickens's Eng-
land, replete with orphanages, workhouses, and debtor prisons for
the poor. Happily, Congress seems unwilling to acquiesce to the
extreme solutions of the more doctrinaire conservatives among the
administration's policymakers. Drastic transformations in the sys-
tem of safety net programs are unlikely; its ends continue to be
carried out through the systems and methods currently in place.
The safety net analogy of this system of assisting the poor is
appropriate. By its nature the safety net must be a mutually de-
pendent interweaving of programs. These programs necessarily
spread throughout various departments, commissions, and agencies
of government. An action in one department may have a signifi-
cant impact in another department. Regulations promulgated to
provide, create, and uphold the safety net should be carefully ex-
amined for possible adverse consequences to other programs.
42
Secretary Block's regulations regarding earned income and FCMP
are a prime example of the calamitous effects resulting from the
disregard of this principle.
When Congress closed the "household loophole" in the food
stamp program,43 the Secretary of Agriculture seized the opportu-
nity to cut back on the eligibility of some recipients by further
redefining income in the program's regulations. Ironically, the re-
cipients affected by the Secretary's action were among those who
best fit the class of people Congress intended to assist in the rede-
velopment of the food stamp program. The resulting regulation
stated: "Unearned income shall include . . . foster care payments
ermnent function of providing basic human services to those unable to fend for
themselves. See "A Program for Economic Recovery," H.R.J. Res., 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 17,481 (1984).
42. Secretary Block presumably relies on Justice Stevens' dictum in Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-15 (1976), to disregard the effect his regulations
might have on other programs and departments of the government. In Wong, the
Civil Service Commission was chastised by the Court for promulgating rules sup-
posedly motivated by a concern for foreign affairs. The Court stated that "[t]he
only concern of the Civil Service Commission is the promotion of an efficient fed-
eral service." Id. at 114.
It would be specious for the Secretary of Argiculture to argue as a justification
for his regulations that the Department of Agriculture's only purpose concerning
the food stamp program is its efficient operation. The Food Stamp Act was passed
as an integral part of the "Great Society" program. The food stamp program has a
special concern in providing proper nutrition for children suffering from poverty
and neglect. This concern is intrinsically connected to ancillary social welfare pro-
grams and their goals.
43. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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for children or adults."44 The primary effect of this regulation is
to place a substantial impediment in the path of low-income fami-
lies wishing to raise a foster child. An examination of this action
reveals its patent irrationality.
This examination begins by investigating the effects of the
Department's regulation on the families it reaches. Murray v.
Block presented the hardship of the regulation by citing the fol-
lowing facts:
In February, 1985 . .. the Murray household received
$298 in Food Stamps. If the foster child and any foster care re-
imbursements were both excluded from the calculations, the
Murray family would have received $78 more. In April, 1985,
Ms. Murray received $58 in Food Stamps. If the foster child
and her accompanying payments had been excluded from the
calculations the Murray family would have received $159 more
in Food Stamps. In other months, the foster care payment's
inclusion in budgeting result[ed] in ineligibility for any Food
Stamp benefits. To this low-income family, the loss of $159 or
even $78 per month in Food Stamps is very significant.45
This diminution in benefits is, at best, a disincentive for low-
income families to become foster care families. At worst, this reg-
ulation can be viewed as a penalty exacted on low-income families
for undertaking foster care responsibilities. The invidiousness of
this policy, as well as its contravention of congressional intent, is
best understood in light of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) foster care program.46
Under the provisions of the Adoption Assistance Act, states
are to calculate FCMP reimbursement rates "to cover the cost of
(and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervi-
sion, school supplies, a child's personal incidentals, liability insur-
ance with respect to a child, and reasonable travel to the child's
home for visitation."47 This scheme makes no allowance for remu-
nerating the foster care provider or for using FCMP to maintain
the provider's biological family. The foster care regulations pro-
hibit a foster care provider from using any of the FCMP for any
purpose other than to exclusively benefit the foster child.48 In
short, the FCMP may be of no assistance in meeting the foster
family's living expenses. The Secretary is ignoring this fact and
inexplicably designates the payments as unearned income.
This inconsistency has escaped the Secretary of Agriculture,
44. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(ii) (1986).
45. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-676 (1982).




which is particularly odd in light of Congress's Food Stamp Act
definition of income. This definition specifically excludes reim-
bursements that, like FCMP, do not represent a gain to the house-
hold.49 Surely the Secretary knows of this statutory provision
since he has promulgated regulations mirroring this language.50
At this point, it is important to recall the reason for Con-
gress's action in closing the "household loophole." It is from this
same reason that the Secretary has gleaned authority to take the
actions so adversely affecting low income foster care families.
Congress intended to keep families who reside together from regis-
tering as separate households for benefit calculation purposes.
The AFDC foster care program's FCMP, however, includes full re-
imbursement for the foster child's nutritional needs. Under this
rationale, the regulations are functionally superfluous. The foster
child could not qualify as a separate household or member of a
separate cohabitating household under any circumstances.
Congress did speak directly to the interrelationship of the
food stamp program and the AFDC foster care program in the
1981 legislative session. It did so by passing AFDC legislation, not
by amending the food stamp program.51 Congress gave states the
option to include food stamp allocations in income to determine
AFDC52 cash payments.
49. "[R]eimbursements' which do not exceed expenses actually incurred and
which do not represent a gain of benefit to the household" are excluded from in-
come for food stamp purposes. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(5) (1984). In answering the asser-
tion raised in Murray v. Block, the Department makes a conclusory argument. It
contends that the foster child is a member of the household and FCMP "do repre-
sent a gain or benefit to the household." Memorandum in Support of Defendant
Block's Motion to Dismiss, at 8, Murray v. Block, No. 4-85-611 (D. Minn. filed Apr.
25, 1985) (emphasis in original). This conclusory language belies a literalist ap-
proach which, if strictly applied, renders this exclusion nugatory. It is difficult to
imagine any reimbursement that would not constitute a gain or benefit in a strict
sense. After all, if the expense is not reimbursed, it must be to the economic detri-
ment of the household. It is far more reasonable to consider a FCMP as a reim-
bursement intended to be excluded by Congress. The foster family's income for
food stamp purposes is exactly the same with or without the foster child in resi-
dence since, by statute and regulation, the FCMP themselves cannot be used for the
gain or benefit of any one in the household other than that child.
50. "Income exclusions [include] . . . reimbursements for past or future ex-
penses, to the extent they ... do not represent a gain or benefit to a household." 7
C.F.R. § 27 3.9(c)(5) (1985). In these regulations the Secretary has defined such ex-
clusions as "payments... specifically for an identified expense, other than normal
living expenses" and includes by specific example, "(iii) medical or dependent care
reimbursements." As shall be seen, FCMP fully fit this criteria.
51. The AFDC foster care legislation provides that "[t]he term 'aid to families
with dependent children' shall . . . include also foster care." 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(7)(C)(i). While certain reimbursement rates may differ for foster children,
the general provisions of AFDC title IV also apply to the foster care program.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(C)(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides that states may
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Legislative history shows that the change in the definition of
income was Congress's answer to the problem of pyramiding bene-
fits.53 The Senate Finance Committee intended that the
"[a]mendment [to § 602] would specifically permit States to take
into account the value of any food stamps [as income for AFDC
purposes] .... The committee believes that this provision would
* . .mitigate the effects of pyramiding benefits."54
For purposes of examining the Secretary's regulations, this
history is crucial. First, Congress intended to give states the option
of calculating both food stamps and AFDC together. The Secre-
tary's rules give no such option to the state. This generally runs
counter to the "New Federalism," and to Congress's explicit inten-
tion to leave the option to the states.
Second, Congress intentionally chose to deal with the
pyramiding problem by allowing a decrease in the AFDC cash ben-
efits rather than in food stamp benefits. In this way, Congress ex-
pressed a preference for food to be a constant percentage of a
family's total budget. Congress would have been evincing a very
different social welfare preference had it chosen to allow the de-
crease in benefits to affect the food stamp allocation in favor of
cash derived from AFDC payments. Congress is essentially saying
that nutrition, the very basis of the food stamp program, is Con-
gress's highest priority.
Third, statutorily permitting the inclusion of food stamps as
income for AFDC purposes, combined with the Agriculture De-
partment's regulatory requirement of AFDC income inclusion, is
extraordinarily draconian. A low-income family would suffer a
double penalty for taking in a foster child. This penalty is con-
trary to congressional intent and against the best interests of de-
pendent children.
The Food Stamp Act previously required that "[p]articipating
States or political subdivisions thereof shall not decrease welfare
grants or other similar aid extended to any person or persons as a
consequence of such person's or persons' participation in benefits
made under the provisions of [the Food Stamp Act] or the regula-
include income in "an amount not to exceed the value of the family's monthly allot-
ment of food stamp coupons, to the extent such value duplicates the amount for
food included in the maximum amount that would be payable under the state plan
to a family of the same composition with no other income." Id.
53. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 (emphasis added). "Pyramiding" means receiving multiple benefits for a single
purpose. It is precisely this pyramiding that the Secretary has claimed as the basis




tions issued pursuant to [it]."55 Congress omitted this precise lan-
guage when it restructured the Act in 1977.56 The omission,
viewed in light of the provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(c)(i)
(1982), does not speak to a legislative grant of power to lower food
stamp benefits for AFDC foster care families. To the contrary, the
omission should be read as speaking only to allowing provisions
desired by the states, such as those allowing the set-off of AFDC
cash assistance payments by food stamp benefit values. Nowhere
in the Act does Congress lend credence to the Secretary's program
by indicating it favored cash benefits over food stamp allocations.
The Secretary has contravened a clear legislative scheme by lower-
ing the food stamp allocation of these families.
The Secretary has placed low-income foster parents in an un-
tenable position. On the one hand, a family may be forced to use
the FCMP as household income. This is specifically disallowed by
the statute and by state regulations governing the foster care pro-
gram.57 On the other hand, a family may absorb the lost purchas-
ing power by lowering its food budget. The level of the "thrifty
food plan" is minimal by definition.58 Such a family would there-
fore be forced into a substandard diet: a result clearly at odds with
the legislative intent and purposes of the Food Stamp Act.
For a family caught in the above dilemma, these regulations
provide strong disincentives to taking on foster care responsibili-
ties. This reflects a subtle and unenunciated, yet clear, bias by the
Reagan Administration against low-income foster care providers.
It appears the Reagan administration is intimating that economi-
cally disadvantaged families are somehow less fit to raise children.
Furthermore, it should be recalled that FCMP provide all of
the economic needs of the child in AFDC foster care. Any govern-
ment bias against low-income foster care providers is not due to a
low-income family's inability to provide the child with an adequate
standard of living. Congress determines the standard of living
through the provision of FCMP. It is more likely that government
bias is rooted in determining a person's worth one-dimensionally:
you are what you earn. This class-based distinction is unsupport-
able and irrelevant when the real question is an individual's ability
to love and raise a child. The losers in such a tautology are the ne-
glected children.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(d) (1974).
56. See Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913.
57. See, e.g., Minn. R. 9545.0350 (1984).
58. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the level must be
defined as providing only a minimal standard of living. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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A. The Foster Care Program: Purposes and Provisions
A question which must be answered at this point is whether
the Department of Agriculture's bias against low-income foster
care families is rational. It can be argued that children in out-of-
home placement ought to be in a setting where they will receive
the greatest economic and social benefits possible. In a world
where more is better, this makes sense. The level of FCMP, while
adequate, by no means constitutes affluence. If a child suffers ne-
glect, it can be argued that the solution to the child's problem is
inextricably tied to providing an environment without the eco-
nomic pressures poverty brings on the family. Under such an eco-
nomic-centered scheme, placing a child in a welfare home courts
disaster.
A preference for foster care providers who are not economi-
cally burdened is not necessarily in the child's best interests when
one examines who the foster care children are and what the foster
care program intends to accomplish. A child may be placed in fos-
ter care either voluntarily or by a court order, when continuing
the child's current home conditions would "be contrary to the wel-
fare of [the] child."59 The determination of whether to remove the
child from the home is based on whether the child is categorized
as a "dependent child." A dependent child is defined in part as "a
needy child who has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the death, continued absence from the home, . . . or phys-
ical or mental incapacity [of the parents]."60 The statute empha-
sizes the emotional and psychological well-being of the child.
Income is not stated as a criterion to consider in making a foster
care placement.
Non-economic considerations also provide criteria for the cer-
tification of foster care providers. The basis for child placement
and provider certification determinations vary to some degree
from state to state. All states, however, are charged with develop-
ing plans, based on broad statutory guidelines, to implement the
foster care program to meet the needs of neglected children.61 All
state placement plans must assure that the child "receives proper
care and that services are provided which are designed to improve
the conditions in the home from which [the child] was removed."62
59. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1982).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982).
61. The foster care program generally referred to is statutorily defined in part
IV of the Social Security Act, Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, 42 U.S.C.§§ 670-676 (1983 & Supp. III 1985). The state plan provisions are contained in 42
U.S.C. § 671.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1982).
1986]
Law and Inequality
Each state is responsible for licensing foster care homes based on
this statutory direction.6 3 Income levels of the foster care house-
holds are not included as standards to determine whether a foster
care license is granted.
Under the legislative scheme for foster care placement, eco-
nomic factors should not distinguish one neglected child from an-
other. Likewise, the primary factor to consider in a foster home is
not its income level but, rather, the decent and caring environ-
ment it can offer the child.
In Miller v. Youakim 64 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether states are permitted to distinguish among
equally neglected children based on the nature of the foster home.
At issue in Miller was an Illinois regulation which allowed those
children residing with relatives to receive for the child only the
AFDC level of assistance. Children residing with unrelated foster
parents could qualify for greater payments of the AFDC foster
care program. Justice Marshall stated that such action clearly con-
flicted with Congress's "over-riding purpose of providing the best
available care for all dependent children removed from their
homes." 65
In crucial aspects, the regulations in Miller closely parallel
Department of Agriculture regulations. As was noted earlier, the
Department of Agriculture's regulations substantially reduce the
total FCMP grant. Both the Department of Agriculture's regula-
tions and those at issue in Miller undermine congressional intent
to fully provide for the economic needs of neglected children.
Most importantly, such regulations may discourage those who may
be the best possible providers from taking in foster children. In
this regard, Justice Marshall stated:
Indeed, if the States' interpretation of the statute were
correct, relatives . .. might subordinate their interests in su-
pervising the well-being of youngsters they love to ensure that
these children receive the greater cash benefits and services
available only to foster children placed in unrelated homes.
Similarly, the availability of significantly more financial assist-
ance under AFDC-FC might motivate child-placement authori-
ties to refrain from placing foster children with relatives, even
when those homes are best suited to the needs of the child.66
Viewing the AFDC-foster care legislation as Congress in-
tended, the overriding interest in this program is not merely the
63. Id.
64. 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
65. Id. at 145.
66. Id. at 142 n.21 (emphasis added).
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material well-being of the child, but also the loving and caring en-
vironment in which the child lives. The Act focuses on the neglect
of the child. When such neglect is present the child may clearly be
removed from the home regardless of the neglectful parent's in-
come.67 Justice Marshall has spoken definitively on the congres-
sional intent of this Act. He has directly addressed the crux of the
argument against using food stamps to draw class-based distinc-
tions between foster families. Speaking for the Court, he said:
"The overriding purpose of [the AFDC-foster care program] was to
assure that the most appropriate substitute care be given to those
dependent children so mistreated that a court has ordered them
removed from their homes."68
As an indication of its concern, Congress offered a system of
state subsidies to effect the policy of removing children from
"home environments that are clearly contrary to [their] best inter-
ests."69 Neither the House or Senate reports on the original Act
nor the final bill ever mention income as a consideration when de-
termining an environment's effect on neglected children.70
In addition to circumventing congressional intent by prejudic-
ing the system against low-income families as foster care provid-
ers, a second problem is created by including FCMP in household
income calculations for food stamp purposes. States are unable to
meet the current demand for adequate foster care homes. This is
especially true for children with special physical or emotional
needs. For example, in Minnesota, the Department of Human
Services has established a sliding reinbursement scale to attract, or
at the very least, to not dissuade foster care families from dealing
with the needs of special children.71 The Department of Agricul-
ture rules work directly contrary to this purpose. As the FCMP of
a special child increase to compensate for the increased expense of
caring for that child, the food stamp allocation to the family is de-
creased under Secretary Block's earned income regulations. If the
child has several disabilities, the FCMP will most likely be raised
67. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
68. Miller, 440 U.S. at 145.
69. S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1961).
70. See also S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1962). Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 65 (1962).
71. Minnesota Rules establish the basic reimbursement rates for foster children
in Minnesota. An additional care rate is determined based on a system of points
which are added for a "difficulty of care" criterion defined as either emotional,
physical, or auxiliary. A maximum of 175 points can be assigned to any child.
Minn. R. 9500.0350 (1984). This point level, for example, would increase the FCMP
for a child 9 to 11 years old from $172 per month, with a per diem of $4.50, to $598
per month at a per diem of $19.40.
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to the point where food stamp benefits will be terminated. This ne-
gates the purpose of federal subsidies to the states to provide for
and effectively recruit alternative homes for neglected children.
It seems clear that Congress realized that foster children
presented special challenges and needs. During debate on this bill,
Senator Eugene McCarthy stated: "The conditions which make it
necessary to remove such [neglected] children from unsuitable
homes often result in needs for special psychiatric and medical
care of the children.... These are the most underprivileged chil-
dren and often have special problems."72 Congress committed it-
self to applying special resources to the situation. Its recognition
of the problems facing foster care providers led to a 1967 amend-
ment to the Act. This amendment increased the federal matching
payment to the states for AFDC foster care to beyond that paid for
basic AFDC care.73 In light of this specific history and affirmative
legislative action, Secretary Block's regulations effectively ignore
the congressional intent behind the foster care program.
B. Profile of Foster Care Children: Class-Based Intrusions
on Racial/Cultural Heritage
Retaining a child's socioeconomic and cultural heritage has
been a major concern in foster care administration. The Supreme
Court, in discussing this concern, noted that "the poor resort to
foster care more often than other citizens," and that "minority
families are also more likely to turn to foster care."74 The Court
pointed out that middle and upper income families needing tempo-
rary services for their children have the resources to purchase pri-
vate care.75 The poor do not.
A leading authority on child welfare services has indicated
that a disproportionate number of chldren in foster care come
from one parent, non-white families on public assistance. 76 These
children are no strangers to the social services network. A major-
ity of children coming into the system were receiving income
maintenance and other supportive services under AFDC before
their out-of-home placement. 77
72. 108 Cong. Rec. 12,692-93 (1962).
73. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 205(b), 81 Stat.
892 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1967)).
74. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1976).
75. Id. at 834 (citing Martin Rein, Thomas Nutt & Heather Weiss, Foster Fam-
ily Care: Myth and Reality, in Children and Decent People 24, 25-29 (Alvin Schorr
ed. 1974)).
76. Alfred Kadushin, Child Welfare Services 325 (1980).
77. Id. at 327.
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Minnesota's experience is similar to this nationwide trend,
particularly in relation to the ethnic and racial composition of fos-
ter care children. The rate of out-of-home placements, including
foster care placements for Indian children in Minnesota, is nearly'
ten times that of the majority white population. For Black chil-
dren the rate exceeds five times that of the white population.7
8
This disparity is of special concern to Minnesota officials.
Their concern is evidenced by the Department of Human Services'
rule directing that local social service agencies "shall provide for
the preservation of the child's religious, racial, cultural, and ethnic
heritage through: A. placement if possible.., in a foster home of
similar background."7 9 As the statistics show, those who tend to
end up in foster care situations are both poor and minority chil-
dren. Consequently, the greatest demand for foster homes is in
the minority community. It follows that if the placement policy is
to be implemented, the minority communities will have to be
heavily included in the foster family system. Secretary Block's
regulations concerning food stamps and FCMP are not assisting
the situation. In Minneapolis, for example, it is estimated that
two-fifths of the families in the Indian community who could pro-
vide foster care services are living well below the federally estab-
lished poverty level and are eligible for food stamps.8 0 The earned
income regulations are a direct disincentive to all of these families
to open their homes to a foster child.
Congress voiced its agreement with the United States
Supreme Court that foster care is generally a "class-based intru-
sion into the family life of the poor."s1 Congress acted specifically
upon this analysis of the foster care system and generally on out-
of-home placements of neglected children by passing the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA).82 The ICWA attempts to ensure that
an Indian child is placed in a home reflecting "the unique values of
Indian culture."8 3 It requires that "[i]n any foster care or preadop-
tive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to placement [within the Indian cultural
context]."84
78. This information is gleaned from a Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices report of a national one-day count of children in foster care placement. The
results are published in Child Welfare Research Note Number 7, May 1984, at 6.
79. Minn. R. 9560.0630 (1984).
80. City of Minneapolis Planning Department, Minneapolis American Indians:
A Population Report 8 (1984).
81. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833 (1976).
82. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
83. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
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Congress's belief in the urgency of Indian child placement is
underscored by the House report on the bill authorizing the Indian
Child Welfare Act. The House stated in unambiguous terms that
"[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children from their families
is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of American In-
dian life today."85
In light of this strong language, the Secretary's action in
promulgating the regulations including FCMP as unearned income
only reinforces the perception that it was enacted both in disre-
gard to congressional intent and in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. In fact, Congress has stated that a preference shall be
given to placements in the Indian cultural community absent a
good cause to the contrary.86 The Secretary's action surely im-
pedes such a placement.
The Secretary has argued that he need not be concerned with
the rationality or effect of rulemaking on programs such as the
ICWA or, for that matter, the AFDC foster care program.8 7 He
has no authority over programs outside his department's purview.
He contends that another department's programmatic regulations
cannot affect the Agriculture Department.8 8
The Secretary's contention is disingenuous. In light of the
prominant role of the Food Stamp Act's history as an integral part
of the welfare system, and considering the administration's frantic
attack on that welfare system, the Secretary's actions appear alto-
gether mean-spirited. The crowning achievement of a Reaganite,
it seems, is not only to dismantle your own program, but to destroy
a broad number of aid programs as well.8 9
The Secretary may contend that the ICWA's terms do not
limit the Secretary's authority over the food stamp program and so
"imposes no duty on the Secretary of Agriculture." 90 It seems that
it is against the demands of rationality, consistency, and equity for
the Secretary to blithely ignore congressional authority on so nar-
row a ground. It has long been an accepted canon of statutory in-
85. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 7530, 7531.
86. 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
87. Defendant's Response, supra note 12, at 3, 4.
88. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 7, at 7.
89. Such a perspective is not surprising from a Secretary of Agriculture who
sees his department's greatest role as aiding in United States military hegemony.
This is illustrated by the Secretary's remarks soon after his confirmation by the
Senate when he said that "[flood was America's greatest diplomatic weapon." Seth
King, Block Sees Food as U.S. Weapon in Foreign Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1980,
at 1A, col. 5.
90. See Defendant's Response, supra note 12, at 3.
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terpretation to construe a law so as not to render another statute
ineffective. Secretary Block has boldly destroyed the effectiveness
of a statute through regulation.
The crucial fact facing the Secretary and the administration
is that a scattershot, piecemeal dismantling of the social welfare
safety net, without regard to its legislative environment, can have
disasterous effects on both real persons and on United States soci-
ety as a whole. The question remains whether the Secretary of
Agriculture exhibited manifest incompetence in promulgating reg-
ulations clearly in conflict with congressional purposes and intent
or incredible arrogance in disregarding the legislative branch's
strong message.

